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Agriculture  in  many  industrialized  countries  is  subject  to a wide  range  of  policy  interventions  that  seek
to achieve  ambitious  climate,  energy  and environment-related  objectives.  Increasing  support  for  the
generation  of  climate-friendly,  renewable  energy  in agriculture,  however,  may  lead  to  potential  conﬂicts
with  agri-environmental  policies  aimed  at land  use  extensiﬁcation  and  landscape  preservation.  These
potential  trade-offs  and  inconsistencies  in  terms  of  policy  implementation  are  not  yet well understood,
since  conventional  tools  for agricultural  economic  assessment  work  on an  aggregate  regional  level and
do not  fully  capture  the  likely  farmer  responses  when  making  a choice  between  investments  in biogas
production  and  participation  in agri-environmental  policy  schemes.
We employed  a farm-level  model  to analyze  the  reaction  of  a heterogeneous  farming  population  in
Southwest  Germany  to  the  incentives  set  by the  German  Renewable  Energy  Act  (EEG),  on  the  one  hand,
and  the  agri-environmental  policy  scheme  MEKA,  on  the  other.  Our  simulations  indicate  a  potentially
large  decrease  of  MEKA  participation  due  to biogas  production  supported  under  EEG.  The success  of the
2012  EEG  revision  in  reducing  the ‘maiziﬁcation’  of  agricultural  landscapes  will critically  depend  on  the
local  demand  for  biogas  excess  heat.  In any  case,  the  EEG  revision  does  not  alleviate  conﬂicts  between  the
expansion  of renewable  energy  and  environmental  considerations,  but rather  shifts  priorities  from  the
former to the  later:  the  simulated  reductions  of  maize  areas  are  achieved  by  a  considerable  reduction  in
overall biogas  production  (“output  effect”),  and not  by encouraging  less  maize-intensive  feedstock  mixes
(“substitution  effect”).
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ntroduction
The last two decades have seen a shift of focus in agricultural
olicies from direct subsidization of agricultural production toward
ayments for public goods and services, environmentally-friendly
roduction and greenhouse gas reduction. This shift addresses
rowing public concern for the externalities of food production, cli-
ate change and the conservation of traditional rural landscapes
nd farming systems. The motivation behind this development can,
o a certain extent, be further attributed to the desire of policy mak-
rs to maintain a certain level of support for farming, and at the
ame time respond to the pressure to phase out coupled support
rising in trade negotiations (Baylis et al., 2008; Harvey, 2003). In
ny case, the wide array of different policy objectives bears the
anger that individual policy measures are narrowly targeted at
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 711 459 23637.
E-mail address: christian.troost@uni-hohenheim.de (C. Troost).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.01.028
264-8377/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unone objective, while inadvertently counteracting another objective.
This danger is even more prevalent if different political depart-
ments and scientiﬁc communities are targeting different objectives
(Poe, 1997).
In order to reduce dependency on fossil fuels, reduce green-
house gas emissions and – in some cases – create new markets
for agricultural products, many countries have started promoting
bioenergy and biofuel production. The Renewable Energy Direc-
tive of the European Union, the US Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS), or the National Alcohol Program (and its successors) and
the National Program on Biodiesel Production and Usage (PNPB) in
Brazil are only the most prominent examples (Sorda et al., 2010).
As these policies have become more widespread, the focus of pub-
lic debate has shifted from their positive effects for greenhouse
gas mitigation and energy security toward undesired side effects
through increased agricultural land prices and direct and indi-
rect land use changes (Janda et al., 2012; Ziolkowska and Simon,
2011; Zilberman et al., 2014). On the one hand, including the emis-
sions from direct and indirect land use change into the analysis
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Use Po
l
(
t
I
a
v
l
a
e
(
g
e
t
f
v
G
W
I
r
t
a
r
t
w
u
G
g
b
h
f
l
e
w
o
E
f
m
2
o
i
t
a
t
c
(
c
w
c
c
t
S
m
c
r
e
d
B
i
r
e
r
g
gC. Troost et al. / Land 
eads to much lower GHG reduction potentials from bioenergies
Searchinger et al., 2008; Janda et al., 2012). On the other hand,
hese side effects may  trigger serious environmental implications.
n Brazil for example, increased biofuel production from sugarcane
nd soybean led to high deforestation rates and a loss of biodi-
ersity through mono-cropping and the expansion of agricultural
ands (Timilsina and Shrestha, 2010), while in the US a considerable
mount of grassland was converted to cropland leading to more soil
rosion, higher fertilizer uses and increased carbon dioxide releases
Hertel et al., 2010; Wright, 2013). Contributing to topsoil loss,
rass- and wetland conversion, and water pollution and threat-
ning biodiversity the Renewable Fuel Standard produces exactly
he negative environmental externalities of agriculture that other
ederal agri-environmental policy programs such as the Conser-
ation Reserve Program, the Conservation Security Program, the
rassland Reserve Program, the Wetlands Reserve Program, the
ildlife Habitat Incentives Program, or the Environmental Quality
ncentives Program as well as many state-level initiatives intend to
educe (Baylis et al., 2008).
Similar conﬂicts can be expected to arise between the ambi-
ious renewable energy targets set forth by the European Union
nd their members states (Klessmann et al., 2011) and the envi-
onmental and social objectives promoted by the second pillar of
he EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As a speciﬁc example,
e analyze the side effects of the expansion of biogas production
nder the German Renewable Energy Act (‘Erneuerbare-Energien-
esetz’, EEG) in this article. Intended to contribute to greenhouse
as mitigation, this package of various policy instruments has
oth triggered an intensiﬁcation of agricultural land use – which
as been labeled a “maiziﬁcation” of German agriculture – and
armer complaints of excessive land rental prices. This recent
and-use change is at odds with the objectives of the agri-
nvironmental measures under the second pillar of the EU CAP,
hich promotes the reduction of chemical input use, conservation
f biodiversity and upkeep of traditional agricultural landscapes.
specially, the expansion of silage maize areas for use as feedstock
or renewable energy production has led to growing environ-
ental concerns (Lupp et al., 2014; Pedroli et al., 2013; SRU,
007). In an effort to reduce the environmental side-effects
f biogas production, recent amendments to the German EEG
ntroduced upper bounds for the use of maize silage, an incentive
o diversify substrate mixes and obligatory co-generation of heat-
nd-power.
A number of policy studies have examined how farmers respond
o the incentives set by the EEG and consequently adapt their agri-
ultural land use – with rather ambiguous insights. Goemann et al.
2010), for example, found that the 2009 amendment of the EEG
ould not be expected to lead to a reduction of maize production. It
ould rather lead to an increase in production and aggravate land
ompetition, especially in regions with high livestock densities. In
ontrast, Delzeit et al. (2012, 2012b) expect the 2012 amendment
o have a dampening effect on silage maize production. Schulze
teinmann and Holm-Müller (2010) found that maize silage is the
ost proﬁtable feedstock, even when considering higher transport
osts for larger, more centralized biogas plants – conﬁrming similar
esults from Austria by Walla and Schneeberger (2008). More gen-
rally, Sorda et al. (2013) investigated the development and spatial
istribution of biogas production in North Rhine-Westphalia and
avaria over the next 20 years. They expect biogas production to
ncrease for another ten years under EEG 2009 conditions, while a
eduction of feed-in tariffs would considerably slow down biogas
xpansion and favor smaller plant sizes. An increase in electricity
emuneration would, however, not signiﬁcantly increase electricity
eneration from biogas.
Little attention has been paid so far to the interaction of bio-
as support policies with agri-environmental policy schemes. To alicy 46 (2015) 50–64 51
certain extent, this is a consequence of the high level of aggrega-
tion in conventional policy simulation models. The studies cited
above analyzed investment decisions in biogas electricity gen-
eration by modeling a regional decision-maker representing the
aggregated decisions of all farmers in a municipality or an even
larger geographical area. In theory, assuming perfectly function-
ing regional markets and inter-farm cooperation, the simulated
centralized optimization of biogas plants and their spatial distribu-
tion is equivalent to the aggregate outcomes of individual farmer
decision-making as long as the so-called aggregation error has been
minimized (Hazell and Norton, 1986). In reality, farmer coopera-
tion is limited and both, biogas investments and participation in
agri-environmental schemes, are especially dependent on farm-
speciﬁc circumstances (Walla and Schneeberger, 2008; Delzeit
et al., 2012; Delzeit and Kellner, 2013; Wilkinson, 2011). Payments
for environmental services are seldom the main source of farm
income nor the main driver of agricultural production decisions, but
rather taken up if they ﬁt into the general production setup of the
farm.
In the present article, we therefore shift the scale of analysis:
we employ a farm-level model to simulate both, the decision for
investment in biogas production and the decision to participate in
agri-environmental measures, as an integral part of the individ-
ual farmer decision-making. To derive regional-level results, we
run our model for all full-time farm holdings of our study area, the
Central Swabian Jura in South-West Germany, instead of only for
a few representative agents. Our simulation results illustrate the
potential magnitudes of interaction and conﬂicts between biogas
support and agri-environmental policies.
The paper is organized as follows: after discussing the potential
conﬂicts between biogas support and agri-environmental policies
in the study area (Section “Biogas support and agri-environmental
policies in Germany”), we describe the modeling approach and
the setup of the simulation experiments in Section “Data &
methodology”. We  examine (Section “Results”) and discuss (Sec-
tion “Discussion”) the effects of both types of policy interventions
on biogas capacity, silage maize area, farm incomes, land rents,
grassland extensiﬁcation and diversiﬁcation of crop rotations. We
conclude by identiﬁying research priorities to improve precision
and reliability of estimates (Section “Conclusions”).
Biogas support and agri-environmental policies in Germany
Our analysis focuses on the potential goal conﬂicts between
the federal Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz,
EEG) and the agri-environmental policy measures of the second pil-
lar of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which have been
implemented under the name “Compensation Scheme for Market
Easing and Landscape Protection” (Marktentlastungs-und Kultur-
landschaftsausgleich, MEKA) in the state of Baden-Württemberg.
The EEG aims to contribute to climate change mitigation, a global
environmental goal, via the promotion of renewable electricity
production, e.g. from biogas. As a consequence, it incentivizes
the intensiﬁcation of agricultural production, leading to the ten-
dency of biogas farmers to specialize in silage maize production
with adverse consequences to biodiversity and agricultural land-
scapes. Moreover, high proﬁt margins and guaranteed revenues
have driven up rental prices for farmland and favor large produc-
tion units. The MEKA scheme, in contrast, comprises a portfolio
of very diverse measures aiming mainly at environmental beneﬁts
that are rather local in scope. Goals include the conservation of bio-
diversity, landscapes resulting from traditional farming practices,
and traditional animal breeds as well as a reduction of pesticide
use – all generally associated with land-use extensiﬁcation, rather
than intensiﬁcation of production.
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he Renewable Energy Act (EEG)
The EEG1 was created in the year 2000 as a successor to the
lectricity Feed Act (“Stromeinspeisegesetz”, SEG) of 1991 and
nderwent major revisions in 2004, 2009 and 2012. It obliges elec-
ricity providers to buy electricity produced from renewable energy
ources at a ﬁxed price, which is speciﬁc to the type of energy
ource used and deﬁned so as to make electricity production from
his source proﬁtable. At the same time, the price is reduced by a
ertain percentage every year in order to set incentives for tech-
ological development increasing production efﬁciency. The price
alid in the year a biogas plant went into production is guaran-
eed for electricity generated from this plant for the following 20
ears. In addition, the guaranteed basic price decreases by volume
ollowing a system of four tiers (respectively ﬁve tiers from 2012).
While the price levels for biogas electricity set by the original
ersion of the EEG enabled municipal biogas plants operating with
rganic waste to work proﬁtably, they were too low to spark sub-
tantial investment in the agricultural sector. As a consequence, the
004 revision of the EEG introduced a bonus for the use of energy
rops, plant material and manure (the so-called NaWaRo bonus).
his amendment resulted in a biogas boom in German agriculture
FNR, 2009). Additionally, the 2004 amendment created a reward
or the external use of excess heat from biogas plans, the combined
eat and power (CHP) bonus.
After the intensiﬁcation of energy maize production received
ncreased public attention, the 2009 amendment2 introduced an
dditional manure bonus, paid on top of the NaWaRo bonus, if at
east 30% of the feedstock consisted of farm-yard manure. Apart
rom this, the amendment mainly redeﬁned guaranteed prices and
onuses, generally favoring smaller electricity volumes over larger
nes.
The most recent EEG amendment,3 approved in 2012, con-
titutes a major revision to the incentive structure for biogas
roduction. While the general system of guaranteed prices and
olume tiers was maintained, NaWaRo and manure bonuses were
eplaced by speciﬁc prices for feedstock classes, where Class I
omprises energy crops and Class II, manure, legumes and mate-
ial from landscape conservation cuts. The price received is then
alculated according to the share of feedstock classes used in
he production mix. To receive remuneration under EEG 2012,
eedstock must consist of no more than 60% of maize silage, corn-
ob-mix, or cereal grains. The external use of produced heat of
t least 25% in the ﬁrst year and 60% in the following years
s made obligatory unless at least 60% of the feedstock used is
anure. As a consequence, the CHP bonus has been abolished.
urther, a special higher and untiered guaranteed price for small
iogas plants up to 75 kW with at least 80% manure use was
ntroduced.
The various amendments of the EEG reﬂect how the inten-
ions behind renewable energy legislation have changed over
ime. At the onset, legislators focused on increasing incentives
or biogas plants, while recently the emphasis has been much
ore on avoiding perceived adverse consequences from the biogas
oom.
1 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1, Nr. 13 (2000), Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuer-
arer Energien (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz – EEG) sowie zur Ánderung des
nergiewirtschaftsgesetzes und des Mineralölsteuergesetzes. 31. MÄrz 2000, pp.
05–309.
2 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1, Nr. 49 (2008). Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechts der
rneuerbaren Energien im Strombereich und zur Ánderung damit zusammenhÄn-
ender Vorschriften. 25. Oktober 2008, pp. 2074–2100.
3 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil 1, Nr. 42 (2011). Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechtsrah-
ens für die Förderung der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien. 28. Juli
011, pp. 1634–1678.licy 46 (2015) 50–64
The Compensation Scheme for Market Easing and Landscape
Protection (MEKA)
The Compensation Scheme for Market Easing and Landscape
Protection (“Marktentlastungs-und Kulturlandschaftsausgleich”,
MEKA) is an agri-environmental support scheme implemented
by the state government of Baden-Württemberg within the legal
framework deﬁned by the EU in Council Regulations (EEC) 2078/92
and (EC) 1257/1999, which forms part of the second pillar of the
EU Common Agricultural Policy. EU regulations require farmers
to commit to a measure for at least ﬁve years and compensation
payments to be calculated based on the additional cost of imple-
menting the measure compared to current obligatory regulations.
So far, there have been three phases of the MEKA program:
MEKA I from 1994 to 1999, MEKA II from 2000 to 2006, and
MEKA III from 2007 to 2013. For each phase, the scope of support
measures and levels of support underwent substantial revisions.
MEKA III, the most recent phase, includes 20 measures, which
are listed under the seven categories: (A) environmentally-friendly
farm management, (B) conservation of agricultural landscapes, (C)
conservation of especially endangered land uses, (D) abandonment
of synthetic chemical inputs, (E) extensive and environmentally-
friendly plant production, (F) use of biological plant protection,
and (G) conservation of speciﬁc protected habitats (MLREV,
2011).
Our analysis in this paper will focus on four measures: mea-
sure 2 from category A rewards the diversiﬁcation of crop rotations
with, at present, 20 Euro per ha. To do so, it requires the produc-
tion of at least four crops, each with a minimum share of 15%
of their total arable area and restricts maize production to 40%
of the area. The other three measures are part of category B and
related to extensive grassland use. Commitment to any of these
measures requires the farmer to refrain from grassland conversion
and non-speciﬁc use of chemical plant protection on grasslands.
Under measure B1, farms that restrict livestock density to under
2 livestock units (LSU) per ha, abstain from grassland conversion,
and mow  5% of their committed grassland area after the 15th of
June receive 50 Euro per ha of qualifying grassland. Measure B2
imposes maximum livestock densities of 1.4 LSU per ha of agricul-
tural area, 1.4 grazing livestock units (gLSU) per ha of fodder area,
and a minimum density of 0.3 gLSU per ha of fodder area. It awards
100 Euro per ha of grassland committed. The third measure, B4 is
result-oriented (Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010; Burton and Schwarz,
2013) and awards 60 Euro per ha if at least four out of a catalog of
28 characteristic plant species can be observed on the committed
extensive grassland area.
Data & methodology
Study area
We  assess the potential conﬂict between these agri-
environmental and renewable energy support schemes in the
Central Swabian Jura (Fig. 1), a low mountainous area (650–850
m.a.s.l.) located between Stuttgart and Ulm, covering 1300 km2
and accounting for about 80% of the district of Reutlingen and
33% of the district of Alb-Donau. Agricultural production in the
area is constrained by shallow soils and a comparatively harsh
climate (mean annual temperatures around 7 ◦C, mean annual
precipitation 800–1000 mm)  and characterized by a relatively
balanced mix  of crops and livestock production. A sequence of
winter barley, winter rapeseed, winter wheat and summer barley
is the dominant crop rotation, with some silage maize, clover and
ﬁeld grass production intermixed for dairy and cattle farmers. For
the year 2012, Dederer and Messner (2011) report 95 biogas plants
C. Troost et al. / Land Use Policy 46 (2015) 50–64 53
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ith a total installed biogas capacity of 28,206 kW in the two
istricts containing our study area. Moreover, the area provides
everal landscape amenities (biosphere reserve) and enjoys fame
s a tourist attraction (hiking, skiing, thermal baths, etc.)
arm decision model
To analyze the effect of EEG and MEKA on agricultural land
se, we simulate the investment and production decisions of every
ull-time farm of the area using the farm-level model that was
eveloped in Troost et al. (2012) and Troost and Berger (2014) for
his study area. The model assumes that farmers allocate their pro-
uction factors (land, labor and capital) such that they maximize
xpected farm income given their individually speciﬁc resources
nd production options, sales and input prices, and the technical
nd agronomic constraints governing agricultural production. This
ecision is implemented as a mixed integer programming (MIP)
roblem and solved for each full-time farm in the study area.
The objective function to be maximized represents expected
arm income as a function of revenues from crop production Rc,
nimal husbandry Rh, biogas production Rb and received premiums
rom EU CAP and MEKA schemes Rp subtracting variable costs
, ﬁxed costs (respectively annualized investment cost for new
nvestments) F, and the balance of interest paid and received I as
hown in Eq. (1). Here pe denotes expected prices, ye expected
ields, a crop and grassland activities, f the part of the crop that is
sed as animal feed, h animal husbandry activities, k biogas produc-
ion, z the ﬁrst year of biogas production, M machinery owned and
mployed, B buildings and infrastructure owned, Ar the amount of
and rented in and l hired labor.
ax ! e = Rc(pe, ye, a, f) + Rh(pe, h) + Rb(k, z) + Rp(a, h)
− V(pe, a, h, f, M, l) − F(pe, B, M, Ar) + I (1)The model as used in the present article allows for investments
n farm machinery and biogas plants. Crop production comprises
inter wheat, winter rapeseed, summer and winter barley, silage
aize, ﬁeld grass production and fallow on arable land as wellapted from CLC, 2009).
as grassland cultivation at four levels of intensity (abandonment,
extensive use, 2 or 3 uses per year) and with ﬁve potential uses:
hay, grass silage, pasture, cutting of fresh grass for direct feeding as
well as late and very late maintenance cuts compatible with MEKA
requirements. The agents distinguish nine different soil classes for
arable land, which affect crop yields and tractor power required for
ﬁeld work. Crop yields have been simulated using the crop mod-
eling package Expert-N based on the parameterization presented
in Aurbacher et al. (2013). Grassland is considered a separate soil
class, which has not been subdivided further. Grass yields depend
only on management and are based on grass regrowth functions
calculated from data given in Berendonk (2011). Crop production is
constrained by agronomic limits to crop shares in the rotation and
preceding-following crop relationships as well as the ﬁeld work
capacity of the farm, which is calculated as a function of labor
and machinery endowments as well as expected days with suitable
weather (see Troost and Berger, 2014 for a detailed discussion).
Animal production comprises dairy production, calf and heifer
raising, bull fattening, suckler cow herding, piglet production and
raising, and pig fattening and is constrained by existing stable
capacities and the manure usage of crop production. Animal feeding
requirements have been formulated in terms of nutrient and ﬁber
demands following LfL (2010, 2011) allowing the farm agent a great
deal of ﬂexibility in the combination of bought and self-produced
fodder. Other inputs and labor demands are based on KTBL (2010).
Sales, input and machinery prices are based on LEL (2010, 2011,
2011), destatis (2012) and KTBL (2010).
The complete MIP  matrix representing the investment and pro-
duction decision problem of a farmer in the area comprises around
6900 variables in about 3800 equations. A full model description
including all equations can be found in the model documentation
(see Troost, 2014). In the following sections, we  concentrate on
describing the representation of biogas production and the EEG and
MEKA restrictions in the model most relevant to the present article.
This MIP  problem is solved for each full-time farm in the area
setting capacities (and a few farm-speciﬁc matrix coefﬁcients)
according to the observed characteristics of the farm. The model
is implemented using the agent-based software package MPMAS
(Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011), although the model as used
in the present article abstracts from any agent–agent interactions
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i.e. it is a nonconnected agent-based model in the deﬁnition of
erger et al., 2006). In keeping with MPMAS  conventions, we  will
se the term farm agent to refer to the model representation of an
ndividual farm throughout this article.
Troost and Berger (2014) created statistically representative
gent populations for the study area for the years 1999, 2003, and
007 based on Agricultural Census and Farm Structure Survey data
FNZ, 2010), a farm survey as well as population statistics (destatis,
011, 2012, 2012, 2012). The simulations in this article use the
ample of agent populations representing the 533 full-time farm
ouseholds observed in 2007.
iogas production in the model
As information about the exact number of biogas plants and
heir distribution over farm types in the study area has not been
ecorded, we decided to initialize the model without any existing
iogas plants.4 As a consequence, production of biogas electric-
ty requires an investment in biogas plant capacity in our model
etup in any case. Contrary to other studies (Delzeit et al., 2012;
orda et al., 2013), our implementation does not restrict invest-
ent options to a small discrete set of predeﬁned plant sizes, but
ather let farm agents freely choose the income-maximizing capac-
ty given their individual technical constraints (i.e. farm size, labor
nd machinery endowments, soil types, etc.) To reﬂect economies
f scale, investment costs were implemented as a linear function
f plant size estimated at 394, 249 D +2459 D /kW × capacity [kW]
ased on data from Stenull et al. (2011) and FNR (2010). As we  had
o information available on the cash reserves of individual farms,
e also neglected any form of down payments on biogas plants and
sed a rather moderate interest rate of 6% on foreign capital. We
enerally assumed a lifetime of 20 years for biogas plants follow-
ng KTBL (2010), though the actual lifetime used in the investment
alculus of the model may  be lowered to the expected remaining
ifetime of the farm, which in some of the tested model conﬁg-
rations (see Section “Simulation experiments” and Appendix B)
epends on the farm manager’s or his/her potential successor’s age.
Maintenance of the biogas plant requires 504.4 h of labor inde-
endent of plant size (FNR, 2006) and 132.74 Euro per kW each year
or repair, laboratory analysis and insurance (Stenull et al., 2011).
dditionally, we considered that a replacement of the engine for
80 Euro is usually necessary after ten years (FNR, 2006).
In the model, biogas electricity can be produced from maize
ilage, grass silage, wheat silage as well as from pig or cattle manure.
his feedstock must be produced on the agent’s farm as trade of
iogas feedstock is not included in our present analysis. Electric-
ty yields for different types of feedstock have been calculated as a
roduct of electric efﬁciency, the speciﬁc heating value of methane
f 10 kWh/m3 (FNR, 2010) and the feedstock speciﬁc methane yield
alculated from the KTBL production standards database (KTBL,
010) (see Table 1). Heat yields were calculated correspondingly
sing thermal efﬁciency. We  assumed an electrical efﬁciency of 35%
nd a thermal efﬁciency of 45% (FNR, 2006; KTBL, 2009), and that
0% of the produced heat is available for external use (Stenull et al.,
011).
Labor demand for biogas production (auGHg ) amounts to 0.5 min/t
or manure and 5 min/t for other feedstock (FNR, 2006). Input elec-
ricity equivalent to 7% of the generated electricity is consumed
ollowing KTBL (2010). Details on the implementation of biogas
roduction in the MIP  can be found in Appendix A.
4 Note: In Troost and Berger (2014) existing biogas plants in 2007 were initial-
zed  based on expert estimation. While we found this acceptable for climate change
daptation analysis, we  preferred using a different type of analysis here where biogas
roduction is at the center of the analysis.licy 46 (2015) 50–64
Agents can sell their electricity either on the free market for
30% of the normal consumer electricity price (following long-term
spot market price development observed at the European electric-
ity exchange in Leipzig), or for the guaranteed price under EEG 2009
or EEG 2012 conditions, depending on the scenario. A comparison
of guaranteed prices under the two  EEG versions for plants estab-
lished in the year 2012 are shown in Table 2. (For consistency, we
compare the two  EEGs for the same year, cf. Section “Simulation
experiments”).
Implementation of remuneration from EEG 2009 is straightfor-
ward in the model: base rate and NaWaRo bonus were applicable
to all types of feedstock considered in our simulation study. The
manure bonus was  paid if at least 30% of the feedstock mass comes
from manure, and the CHP bonus was paid for the electricity pro-
duction equivalent to the amount of heat sold. Unfortunately, we
have currently no information on the marketing opportunities of
heat for individual farmers in the area. We  therefore assessed two
simulation scenarios covering the potential extremes: Either every
or no agent had the opportunity to sell excess heat (scenarios with
and without renewable heating markets, respectively).
The remuneration scheme of EEG 2012 could not be straight-
forwardly implemented in mixed integer programming: ensuring
that the mixture of Class I and Class II prices corresponded to the
feedstock mixture in all volume tiers and that agents did not shift
Class I electricity sales to the <150 kW tier and Class II electricity
sales to the 150–500 kW tier (exploiting the more favorable price
relationship) involved multiplication of solution variables, making
the problem non-linear. This issue was  circumvented by discre-
tization: we  predeﬁned mixtures at a resolution of 10% intervals
and allowed linear combination of two adjacent mixtures, minimiz-
ing the degree of potential tier shifting while still allowing ﬂexible
feedstock mixes.
To receive EEG 2012 payments, agents whose feedstock
consisted of less than 60% manure were obliged to use 25% of the
produced heat in the ﬁrst year and 60% in the following years. Addi-
tionally, the combined feedstock share of maize and (coarse) grains
was limited to a maximum of 60% of total mass content. Alterna-
tively, agents could opt for a small plant (≤75 kW capacity) and
use at least 80% manure. As a consequence, in the scenario with-
out renewable heating markets, a manure share of at least 60% was
required to receive any EEG 2012 payments at all. Details on the
implementation of EEG remuneration in the model can be found in
Appendix A.
MEKA
In the model, the conditions for agent participation in the A2,
B1, B2, and B4 measures of the MEKA III program have been
implemented with the following simpliﬁcations: grassland con-
version was not allowed in our simulations due to the state-wide
ban enacted in 2011. In addition, grassland management practices
parameterized in the model did not consider changes in pesticide
use explicitly. Moreover, grassland use of extensive intensity with
late cuts was  assumed to comply with conditions of MEKA mea-
sure B4, as the exact species composition was  not captured in the
model. Apart from these necessary simpliﬁcations, the modeled
conditions to receive MEKA payments implemented correspond to
the real-world restrictions described in Section “Biogas support and
agri-environmental policies in Germany”. Details on the implemen-
tation can be found in Appendix A.
Simulation experimentsFor policy analysis, we simulated the investment and produc-
tion decisions of farm agents in the study area. Price expectations of
agents were set to the long-term price average (2000–2009) in real
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Table  1
Biogas yields and methane contents of selected substrates (KTBL, 2010).
Cattle slurry Pig slurry Maize silage Grass silage Wheat silage
Biogas yield (m3/t) 30 20 200 190 190
Methane content (%) 55 60 52 53 53
Dry  matter (%) 10 6 33 35 33
Organic dry matter (%/DM) 80 80 95 90 95
Table 2
Guaranteed prices (euro cents) per kWh  of electricity for plants established in 2012 under EEG 2009 and EEG 2012.
kWel EEG 2009 EEG 2012
Base-rate + NaWaRo bonus Manure bonus CHP bonus Class I Class II Small manure plants
≤ 75 25
≤  150 18.1 3.9 2.9 20.3 22.3
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erms of 2009 and EU CAP regulations were implemented as valid
n 2012. With this setup, we compared six hypothetical situations
or the year 2012 combining three EEG scenarios (EEG09, EEG12
nd no EEG at all) with two MEKA scenarios (MEKA III or no MEKA
t all). Both, EEG09 and EEG12 consider the guaranteed prices set
y the respective EEG version for the year 2012. As a consequence
f neglecting existing biogas plants and cash constraints to invest-
ents, simulated outcomes of agent investments in biogas plants
epresent the upper bound of the regional investment potential for
iogas plants based on their proﬁtability in each scenario.
The farm-level model used in this analysis is akin to a process-
ased model in that it explains the phenomenon of interest (policy
ffects on regional biogas production and land use) by disaggregat-
ng it to theoretically known (or empirically observable) processes
the agronomic and technical relationships determining the pro-
uction conditions faced by farmers in the region) in order to derive
onclusions about unobserved situations (counterfactual policy
cenarios). Typically, such farm-level models are subject to con-
iderable uncertainty as the necessary data is not available in the
equired depth and breadth for a full region (Buysse et al., 2007).
tandard technical coefﬁcients have to be used, parameters have
o be chosen ad hoc, parameter variability has to be neglected, pro-
esses are omitted and other process representations are uncertain
r incomplete. Despite a comparably comprehensive database, our
odel is no exception to this rule.
Good modeling practice requires to clearly communicate this
ncertainty to readers and analyze it in order to assess the robust-
ess of results and, on the long run, improve process understanding
Jakeman et al., 2006). Given the typically high uncertainty in agri-
ultural agent-based models, Berger and Troost (2014) suggest to
efrain from identifying a single parameter combination that best
ts observation data (which would neglect all sources of model
ncertainty), but rather present the outcomes of simulation exper-
ments as ranges or distributions over all parameter combinations
hat can be considered potential representations of reality. Follow-
ng this approach, Troost and Berger (2014) used a conservative
alibration approach and identiﬁed 19 parameters in the Central
wabian Jura model that have to be considered uncertain after
alibration.
To efﬁciently cover the parameter space spanned by these 19
arameters in a feasible number of model runs, we ﬁrst ran an
lementary effects screening (Campolongo et al., 2007) to iden-
ify those of the 19 parameters with the highest inﬂuence on the
utcomes relevant for the present analysis, namely the installed
iogas capacity, maize areas, land use and MEKA participation. We
dentiﬁed 14 important parameters (see Appendix B), 13 of which
ere used to construct a Latin hypercube sample (LHS) with 302.9 18.3 20.3
2.9 16 17
2.9 15 16
repetitions. The CHP parameter, which switches markets for renew-
able heating on or off, stood out as the most important parameter
by far. As a consequence, we decided to repeat the full sample for
both options instead of including this parameter in the LHS, i.e.
our experimental design comprised a total of 60 repetitions per
scenario. With six scenarios this leads to a total of 360 model runs.
Results
In this section, we present our simulation results in four steps:
ﬁrst, we  assess the differences in investments in biogas capacity
and silage maize area between EEG 2009 and 2012, before analyz-
ing the interaction between EEG and MEKA policies. To assess the
potential impacts of policy measures on the performance of rural
land markets, we will then take a look at simulated shadow prices
of agricultural land and ﬁnally assess effects on farm incomes.
Effects of the EEG
Table 3 shows the investment in production capacity for bio-
gas electricity simulated under the three EEG scenarios. For each
EEG scenario, the upper line represents the situation where all
agents can sell biogas heat (scenario with renewable heating mar-
ket) and the lower line the scenario where no agent can sell biogas
heat (scenario without renewable heating market). Each line shows
the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of simulated
variables over the 30 repetitions of the Latin hypercube sam-
ple. We  observed a considerable variation in simulated capacities
between repetitions, but differences between EEG scenarios have
a consistent impact across repetitions and are thus robust against
parameter uncertainty. In the model, the 2012 revision of the EEG
led to a reduced investment in biogas capacity of 3–12% compared
to the 2009 version of the EEG when we assumed that all agents had
the opportunity to sell the heat from their plant, and to a reduction
of 91–94%, when we  assumed no agent could sell the heat. Without
the EEG, no agent would have invested in a biogas plant at current
energy price levels. The reduced total biogas capacity in our simu-
lations was  mainly caused by a lower number of agents investing
in biogas plants, while the average capacity per biogas plant was
only lower under EEG 2012 without heat sales.
The simulated differences in biogas production had direct con-
sequences for crop production in the study area. Simulated silage
maize area experienced a three- to ﬁve-fold increase compared to
the situation without EEG support. Again, simulations for EEG 2009
and 2012 were rather similar with only slight reductions in maize
area for EEG 2012 as long as we  assumed every agent to be able
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Table 3
Simulated investments in biogas plants and area used for silage maize production by EEG scenario and with MEKA payments (mean and standard deviation over 30 repetitions).
EEG scenario Renewable heating market Number of investors Average plant size [kW] Total capacity [kW] Silage maize area [ha]
EEG2009 Yes 254 ± 42 101 ± 3 25, 703 ± 4302 8295 ± 1251
No  195 ± 38 101 ± 4 19, 729 ± 3952 7394 ± 1204
EEG2012 Yes 223 ± 39 108 ± 4 24, 086 ± 4237 7969 ± 1220
No  21 ± 5 75 ± 0 1539 ± 381 2116 ± 262
No  EEG Yes 0 ± 0 0 ± 0 0 ± 0 1821 ± 244
No  0 ± 0 0 ± 0 0 ± 0 1821 ± 244
Table 4
Predicted shares of different feedstock in total biogas production in the study area under different EEG scenarios (mean and standard deviation over 30 repetitions).
EEG Renewable heating market Feedstock shares
Grass silage Maize silage Manure
2009 Yes 33 % ± 3.6 39 % ± 4.4 28 % ± 1.5
29 % 
36 % 
4 % 
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o sell biogas heat. Without being able to sell heat, silage maize
roduction was only slightly higher than in the no EEG scenario.
The composition of the feedstock used for biogas production
s shown in Table 4. The average plant size and feedstock com-
osition for EEG 2012 in the absence of heat sales indicates that
nly the small manure plant category (≤ 75 kW with ≥80% farm-
ard manure) offered a proﬁtable option for agents without CHP
otential.
EG and MEKA
Table 5 shows the simulated effect of the different EEG sce-
arios on the area committed to the four MEKA support schemes
ncluded in our simulations. The strongest effect was  observed for
he A2 measure that rewarded crop diversiﬁcation, i.e. requiring
t least four crops, each with an area share of at least 15% in the
rop rotation. Without EEG support, as well as under EEG 2012
ithout renewable heating market, nearly all agents committed
heir arable land to this environmental policy measure, which is
bout four times the area committed in the EEG 2009 scenario with
enewable heating markets.
A similarly strong reduction of committed area in the scenarios
ith biogas expansion could be observed for measure B4, which
ewards conservation of abandoned grasslands. For the support of
xtensive grassland use, we saw a slight decline in area committed
able 5
imulated area registered for participation in the four considered MEKA measures
epending on EEG scenario and with MEKA payments (mean and standard deviation
ver 30 model runs).
Scenario Renewable heating
market
Area [ha] committed to MEKA
measure
A2 B1
EEG2009 Yes 4396 ± 1430 4399 ± 417
No 6589 ± 1724 4903 ± 366
EEG2012 Yes 4808 ± 1445 4978 ± 358
No 17, 037 ± 941 6391 ± 334
No  EEG Yes 17, 304 ± 925 6263 ± 315
No 17, 304 ± 925 6263 ± 315
B2 B4
EEG2009 Yes 9856 ± 302 1452 ± 435
No 9749 ± 331 2100 ± 439
EEG2012 Yes 9467 ± 273 1677 ± 406
No 8529 ± 264 5844 ± 164
No  EEG Yes 8688 ± 240 5974 ± 144
No 8688 ± 240 5974 ± 144± 3.3 41 % ± 4.5 30 % ± 1.7
± 3.3 39 % ± 4.1 25 % ± 1.8
± 1.2 16 % ± 1.2 80 % ± 0.0
to measure B1, while the area agents committed to B2 increased
slightly.
The effects of the MEKA schemes that can be induced from
the counterfactual scenarios without any MEKA payments were
rather small. MEKA support reduced the installed capacity for bio-
gas electricity production by 0–5%, with the exception of the EEG 12
scenario without renewable heating markets, where MEKA support
resulted in a reduction of up to 16%.
Effect on land rents
Since German farmers tend to rent out rather than sell their land
when leaving farming, the land rental market is the most important
vehicle to facilitate structural change in agriculture. To capture the
effects of EEG and MEKA support on the development of land rental
prices, we computed the shadow prices of arable and grassland soils
for each agent. The shadow price, i.e. the marginal production value
of land in each soil type, was estimated by resolving the production
and investment decision of each agent with an additional unit of
this type of soil and observing the additional income that could
be obtained from using the additional amount of land. Note that
the individual shadow price is a marginal value calculated for the
ﬁrst hectare an agent rents in; it does not take into account the
balancing of demand and supply on land rental markets, where land
is also typically transferred in greater units. It can therefore not be
expected to equal the observed rental prices in the study area (in
our simulations the median shadow price for arable land is about
2–4 times the currently observed rental price): still, the simulated
shadow price gives a highly useful indication of the effect of policy
measures on the agent’s willingness-to-pay for agricultural land.
We compared the simulated median shadow price of the agents
between scenarios. Table 6 summarizes the different relative
effects of EEG and MEKA policy scenarios on the marginal produc-
tion value of the most frequent soil type of arable land (mostly
rendzic leptosols) and grassland under the two possible scenarios
with and without renewable heating markets. The median shadow
prices of the scenario without MEKA and without EEG have been set
to 100 for each of the 30 repetitions, and the values of the other sce-
narios have been expressed relative to this. The table shows mean
and standard deviations of relative values over repetitions.
The scenarios under EEG 2009 and EEG 2012 with renewable
heating markets showed high levels of biogas production together
with high shadow prices of land. The median shadow price doubled
compared to the scenario without any EEG support for arable land,
with even stronger effects for grassland. Without renewable heat-
ing markets, the median shadow price remained nearly unaffected
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Table  6
Relative effects of EEG and MEKA on the median shadow price of land (mean and standard deviation over 30 repetitions). Values relative to the scenario without MEKA and
without  EEG, which was set to 100 for each repetition.
MEKA EEG Soil class 0 Grassland
With ren. heating market No ren. heating market With ren. heatingmarket No ren. heating market
Yes 2009 207 ± 49 140 ± 18 802 ± 188 577 ± 103
2012 192 ± 55 104 ± 1 762 ± 201 288 ± 24
No  104 ± 1 104 ± 1 284 ± 22 284 ± 22
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nder EEG 2012 and showed lower, but still considerable increases
nder EEG 2009. The effect of MEKA support on the shadow price of
rable land was negligible, but strong increases in production value
ould be observed for grassland areas.
ffects on income
Fig. 2 depicts the income effects under the various EEG imple-
entations. The box plots show the distribution of the absolute
ncome difference with the respective EEG implementation com-
ared to a scenario without any EEG, over all agents and repetitions.
 change of income, of course, can only be expected if agents invest
n biogas plants: Agents have therefore been grouped in the ﬁgure
ccording to the scenarios in which they invested in a biogas plant:
i) never, (ii) only with EEG 09, (iii) only with EEG 12, or (iv) under
oth EEG 09 and EEG 12. In general, our simulation experiments
uggest income gains between 200 and 600 Euro per ha under EEG
9 and EEG 12 with heating markets. Agents which invested only in
ne of the two market scenarios tended to have lower income gains,
n most cases not reaching 200 Euro per ha, an observation that also
olds for investors under EEG 12 without heating markets.
Fig. 3 shows the simulated income effects of the MEKA scheme
nder the three EEG and two heating market scenarios. Box plots
ndicate the distribution of per-ha income effects over agents and
epetitions, in which potential income effects concentrated around
0–60 Euro per ha.
Income differenc
as distributed over age
ig. 2. Distribution of simulated absolute income effects of two  EEG versions compared t
he  scenarios in which they invest in biogas capacity.693 ± 203 427 ± 115
631 ± 230 104 ± 3
100 ± 0 100 ± 0
Discussion
Our simulation results suggest interactions between EEG and
MEKA policy schemes that go in both directions. If biogas support
is successful in encouraging farmer investments in biogas gener-
ation, it simultaneously and considerably decreases participation
in grassland conservation and crop diversiﬁcation measures under
MEKA. Whether the EEG revision of 2012 substantially changes the
picture apparently depends on the local demand for excess heat
from biogas generation. As explained above, empirical data on local
energy markets are not yet available to accordingly parametrize
the model. If local demand is too low to satisfy the co-generation
requirement of the new EEG, only few farmers are likely to opt
for a small manure plant and invest in biogas plants. As a conse-
quence, the silage maize area will be considerably lower and the
effect on MEKA participation will be minor. Given the importance
of grassland in our study area, the newly introduced 60% cap on
maize silage as feedstock should have only small effects, according
to our simulations. Indeed, the average feedstock share of maize
silage in the EEG 2009 scenarios was only 40% and changed little
in the EEG 2012 scenario with heating markets. The impact of the
biogas support policy on farmer income should be far greater than
the impact of the MEKA measures, at least for those farmers who
are able to invest in biogas production. In simulation experiments,
MEKA payments kept only a few agents from investing in biogas
plants.
e to no EEG
nts and repetitions
o no EEG support over agents and repetitions. Agents were grouped depending on
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Income effect of MEKA
as distributed over agents and repetitions
EKA 
g
i
t
p
p
a
a
s
c
a
t
t
e
l
e
p
l
f
p
m
t
m
o
l
b
o
s
b
m
s
f
i
m
c
m
s
tFig. 3. Distribution of simulated absolute income effects of M
Overall, the potential policy effects on farm incomes showed
reat differences between agents. With regard to biogas support
t has to be considered that, at maximum, about half of the full-
ime farm agents actually had the potential to beneﬁt from biogas
roduction at all. This heterogeneity in policy impacts bears the
otential to accelerate structural change in agriculture, which is
lso illustrated by the doubling of the median shadow prices of
rable land and the corresponding 6–8 fold increase in median
hadow prices of grassland. While the simulated shadow prices
annot be directly translated into land rental prices, they indicate
 strong increase in the willingness-to-pay for farmland. Note that
he MEKA scheme increased the value of grassland in our simula-
ions, albeit starting from rather low levels.
Although our simulation experiments yielded a number of inter-
sting insights, the interpretation of the results is subject to several
imitations: we assessed farmer investment decisions in renewable
nergy plants by means of one-year simulation scenarios under
urely short-term proﬁtability considerations. Due to the current
ack of more precise empirical data, we could not capture that some
armers in the study area have already built biogas plants in the
ast. Liquidity constraints, farm life-cycles and uncertainty will
ost likely preclude immediate investments in many cases, while
he yearly reduction of guaranteed prices tends to make invest-
ents less proﬁtable in the future (depending on the development
f investment costs and substrate costs). In this respect, our simu-
ation scenarios reﬂect the upper bounds of on-farm investment in
iogas plants under the different EEG conditions. The next step in
ur simulation analysis will therefore be to run recursive-dynamic
imulations of 10–20 years. This is possible with our model setup,
ut requires further data and model validation before it can be
eaningfully employed. Further, the distribution of income effects
howed a number of farm agents who can only expect small gains
rom biogas production and it seems uncertain whether a farmer
n reality would be willing to take the investment risk for rather
odest income gains.
Currently, our simulation model abstracts from inter-farmooperation and local trade of silage, due to limited empirical infor-
ation on farm cooperation and fragmented local markets. The
imulations showed relatively small biogas plant sizes and a rela-
ively high number of agents who invest in individual biogas plants.over agents and repetitions depending on the EEG scenario.
In reality, farmers might also choose to jointly build larger biogas
plants.
MEKA participation was hard to validate, as exact measure-
ments for the study area were not available. According to rough
comparisons with aggregate district data for the year 2007, the
model seems to overestimate participation rates. This bias is in line
with our expectations, since our decision model assessed partici-
pation only based on short-term proﬁtability of the measure itself
and did not consider other grassland conservation support outside
the MEKA scheme (e.g. individual tendered contracts), transac-
tion costs, the reluctance of farmers to commit for the required
5 years (Mettepenningen et al., 2013), or potential incongruence
with farmer values (Burton et al., 2008; Burton and Schwarz, 2013).
Incorporating these potential determinants of MEKA participation
in the model will be an important next step to further increase the
reliability of the simulation analysis.
It should not be forgotten either that the hay and grass silage
yields and the dedication of grassland area to measure B4 was
based only on the management decision of the agent, while natu-
ral conditions affecting grass yields and species diversity were not
considered due to lack of data. Parts of the grassland in the study
area may  not support two  or more cuts per year, even under the
best management. Given the important share of grass silage in the
biogas feedstock, this may  also affect investments in biogas plants
and the estimated effects on land shadow prices.
As a consequence, the simulated effects should not be inter-
preted as precise forecasts of policy effects on local level.
Nevertheless, they highlight the general patterns and potential
magnitudes of interaction between the two groups of policy meas-
ures and provide a sound basis upon which to reﬁne future analysis.
Conclusions
Using a farm-level model run for every full-time farm in
our study area, we  simulated interactions and potential conﬂicts
between different environmental policy schemes. Our simulation
approach improved on previous research by modeling investment
and participation decisions from the perspective of individual farm-
ers, while capturing the full heterogeneity of farms in our study
area. In contrast to many other policy simulation studies, our
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odeling approach allowed for a ﬂexible choice of feedstock mix-
ure and plant sizes, and an assessment of the structural and
istributional consequences of policies.
Our simulation results suggest that the effect of biogas sup-
ort on MEKA participation and land use is potentially very large.
hether the latest EEG revision actually reduces the degree of
maiziﬁcation’ and grassland intensiﬁcation depends on the local
arket for biogas excess heat. In any case, any reduction in maize
rea would probably be achieved by a considerable reduction of the
iogas production potential (“output effect”), and not by encour-
ging less maize-intensive feedstock mixes (“substitution effect”).
he latest EEG revision consequently does not resolve the conﬂicts
etween policy objectives, but shifts priorities from the expansion
f renewable energy toward environmental concerns.
Our simulation model provides a sound basis for policy analy-
is, helping to better coordinate policy schemes in the future and
mprove the design of complementary, rather than conﬂicting, pol-
cy schemes. To generate more reliable quantitative estimates, it is
till necessary to improve our empirical data base and to capture
armer cooperation and farmer participation in agri-environmental
olicy schemes. With respect to the latter, research needs to focus
peciﬁcally on transaction costs, the inﬂuence of the required ﬁve
ear commitment to the MEKA scheme, and the inﬂuence of farmer
ttitudes toward agri-environmental policy measures. More ﬁne-
rained spatial information on natural production and conservation
otential will also need to be incorporated into the model. Simula-
ion of biogas investments can be improved by incorporating more
ophisticated agent investment rules that, for example, consider
isk behavior and the optimal timing of investments (e.g. option
alue theory, Anderson and Weersink, 2014). Further, the assess-
ent would beneﬁt from advances in our ability to model locally
estricted demand for excess heat, inter-farm cooperation and feed-
tock trade. In-depth empirical research and theory development
ill be necessary to advance on these issues. The implementa-
ion of the farm-level setup in MPMAS  provides the basis for its
xtension to an agent-based model that then takes these farmer
nteractions into account (see e.g. Nolan et al., 2009; Berger, 2001;
chreinemachers et al., 2007, 2009; Schreinemachers and Berger,
011; Quang et al., 2014).
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ppendix A. Details on the farm model implementation.The farm production and investment decision problem is for-
ulated as a mixed integer programming (MIP) problem of the
orm:
ax!
∑
i
(cixi) +
∑
j
(cjzj)licy 46 (2015) 50–64 59
s.t.
∑
i
(aikxi) +
∑
j
(ajkzj) ≤ bk ∀k
In the following description of the problem, x generally
denotes decision variables, z denotes integer decision variables, a
coefﬁcients of decision variables in constraints, b capacities (right-
hand sides) of constraints and c objective function coefﬁcients of
decision variables. M as a coefﬁcient denotes inﬁnitely high values
to allow implementing yes-or-no switches in the model.
The complete MIP  matrix comprises around 6900 variables
in about 3800 equations. In the following, we will concen-
trate on describing the equations most relevant to the present
article, namely those involved in the representation of bio-
gas production and the EEG and MEKA restriction. A full
model description including all equations can be found in
the model documentation (Troost, 2014) that is available at
https://mp-mas.uni-hohenheim.de/documentation.
A.1. Biogas production
To be able to reﬂect economies of size in the construction
of biogas plants, biogas investments are represented by a size-
independent basic investment decision variable zi˛Ue and the
size-determining decision variable xiˇUe. The investment decision is
formulated for an average year in the near future. Investment costs
for biogas plants are consequently annualized assuming an inter-
est rate of 6% and enter the decision problem as objective function
coefﬁcients (ci˛Ue and ciˇUe).
ciˇUe = −
(
2459 × 0.06 × (1.06)

(1.06) − 1
)
(A.1)
ci˛Ue = −
(
394, 249 × 0.06 × (1.06)

(1.06) − 1
)
(A.2)
We generally assumed a lifetime () of 20 years for biogas plants
following KTBL (2010). In the framework of our uncertainty anal-
ysis, however, we also tested settings where we reduced  to the
expected remaining lifetime of the farm if that was lower than 20
years. Depending on the setting, the expected remaining farm life
is the remaining time until the current household head turns 65 or
the time until the potential successor will turn 65 (see Appendix B).
Maize, wheat and grass silage as well as manure can be used in
fermenters to produce biogas, which is then transformed to heat
and electricity in generators. The production of biogas electricity
from speciﬁc goods (g) is represented by the decision variables xuGg .
Electricity yields auGg are speciﬁc to the feedstock used (see Table 1).
Production of biogas from a certain feedstock is constrained by
production of this feedstock through own  crop (xL) or animal (xA)
production (purchase of feedstock xbG was  originally contained in
the model, but discarded in calibration).
xuGg −
∑
l
(aLGl,gx
L
l ) −
∑
a
(aAGa x
A
a ) ≤ 0 ∀g, (A.3)
Biogas production requires maintenance of the biogas plant
(xmUe) with size-dependent monetary maintenance cost (cˇmUe).
∑
g
(aGUeg x
uG
g ) −xˇmUe ≤ 0
xˇmUe −xiˇUe = bˇUe
xˇmUe −Mz˛mUe ≤ 0
z˛mUe −zi˛Ue = b˛Ue
−Mzi˛Ue +xiˇUe ≤ 0
(A.4)
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(Note: previously installed capacities b˛Ue, bˇUe are zero in the
resent analysis.)
Size-independent labor demand for maintenance (aH˛mUe) and
eedstock-speciﬁc labor demand for biogas production (auGHg ) is
ssumed to occur every day as the biogas plant is run throughout
he whole year. In the model, the labor capacity of the house-
old (consisting of the number of household members working on
he farm, xH, and hired permanent employees, xbpH) can be either
eserved for the seasonal ﬁeld work (xtHw, see Troost and Berger,
014) or for constant daily tasks (xtHd) occurring in animal and
iogas production.
tHw + xtHd − xbpH − xH ≤ 0 (A.5)
Labor reserved for constant daily labor is multiplied by the
ssumed amount of daily working hours (aHd = 9), and is available
or animal production and related activities as well as biogas plant
aintenance and production.
aHdxtHd +
∑
a
(aAHa x
A
a ) + . . . +
∑
g
(auGHg x
uG
g ) + aH˛mUez˛mUe ≤ 0
(A.6)
Biogas production (xuGg ) further requires process electricity
xbGp), which amounts to 7% of electric energy produced (KTBL,
010) and has to be bought at standard electricity prices (cbGp).
.07
∑
g
(auGg x
uG
g ) − xbGp ≤ 0 (A.7)
Special attention was paid to the manure balance as manure
s both an input and a product of biogas production. The manure
alance links land use, animal production and biogas production.
anure produced by animals can be either used in a biogas plant
xuGgo ) or directly spread on the ﬁeld or grassland (x
tGo
go ).
uG
go + xtGogo −
∑
a
(aAGoa,gox
A
a ) ≤ 0 ∀go (A.8)
Currently, we distinguish only two types of manure (go ∈ Go),
attle and pig manure. For simpliﬁcation, we assume that the
esidue from biogas production from manure is equivalent to the
anure input with respect to fertilization. According to expert
pinion this seems justiﬁed as an approximation at least with
espect to total nitrogen amounts, the only nutrient explicitly con-
idered in the crop growth model used to calculate crop yields in
he model. Residue from biogas production with silage feedstock
gb /∈ Go) is transformed into pig and cattle manure equivalents
auGGogo,gb ) based on nitrogen content, so that the balance for organic
ertilization can be formulated as:
l
(aLGol,gox
L
l ) − xuGgo −
∑
gb/∈Go
(auGGogo,gbx
uG
gb
) − xtGogo ≤ 0 ∀go (A.9)At the same time, all the manure produced also has to be spread
n the ﬁeld. For computational reasons, we allow a certain slack
ere in order to give some ﬂexibility to the MIP  solver; the corre-
ponding coefﬁcient manure is part of the uncertainty analysis.
manure
∑
l
(aLGol,gox
L
l ) +
∑
a
(aAGoa,gox
A
a ) +
∑
gb/∈Go
(auGGogo,gbx
uG
gb
) ≤ 0 ∀go
(A.10)licy 46 (2015) 50–64
A.2. The EEG in the model
The EEG guarantees a price to the electricity producer for 20
years from the start of electricity production. The individual price
paid for a kWh  of a certain biogas plant depends on the year the
plant ﬁrst entered into production (yy ∈ Yy)  and is tiered by volume
(yu ∈ Yu).
In the model implementation of EEG 2009, an individual deci-
sion variable xsYyYuyu,yy reﬂects the sale of a quantity of electrical energy
for the price csYyYu valid under tier yu ∈ Yu for plants established in
year yy ∈ Yy.  In the simulations for this article we  generally assume
yy = 2012 (see Table 2 for corresponding prices csYyYu). Agents in
the model who are not not willing to comply with the EEG require-
ments for receiving the guaranteed prices can still sell the electricity
at market prices (xsGe).
xsGe +
∑
yu,yy
xsYyYuyu,yy −
∑
g
(auGg x
uG
g ) ≤ 0. (A.11)
Remuneration of biogas plants under EEG requires registering
the year (xiYy) the biogas plant enters production establishing the
contracted capacity (bYy) that allow receiving the corresponding
guaranteed price (for this analysis bYyyy = 0 ∀yy).∑
yu,yy
xsYyYuyu,yy − x
iYy
yy ≤ b
Yy
yy ∀ yy (A.12)
xiYyyy − xiˇUe ≤ 0 for yy = 2012 (A.13)
Remuneration under each tier is constrained by the maximum
volume allowed under the tier (bYyYuyu ).
xsYyYuyu,yy ≤ bYuyu ∀(yu, yy) (A.14)
Since all feedstock categories considered in our model fulﬁll
the requirements for the EEG 2004 and 2009 NaWaRo bonus, it
is automatically included in csYyYu. The manure bonus of EEG 2009
requires a minimum of 30% manure (g ∈ Go)  in the total mass of the
feedstock. This condition is implemented using a binary decision
of either accepting the condition and receiving the bonus (zyuo) or
relaxing the condition on minimum manure use (znuo) and forgo
the bonus.∑
yu,yy
xosYyYuyu,yy −
∑
g∈Go
(auGg x
uG
g ) ≤ 0
∑
yu,yy
xosYyYuyu,yy −Mzyuo ≤ 0
zyuo +znuo ≤ 1
xosYyYuyu,yy ≤ b
oYyYu
yu,yy ∀(yu, yy)
(A.15)
Apart from the electricity also the heat produced during the
burning of biogas (auGhg ) can potentially be sold (x
suh) or used as
input for animal production (aAGheat) on the farm (replacing heat or
gas purchases, xbGheat). The combined use of heat and electricity is
rewarded with an additional CHP bonus under EEG 2004 and 2009
(xsYuh).
−
∑
g∈Gb
(
auGhg x
uG
g
)
+xtuh ≤ 0
xsuh −xtuh +xtuh2 ≤ 0∑
−xbG
heat
+
a
(
aAGheatx
A
)
−xtuh2 ≤ 0
xsYuh −xtuh ≤ 0
(A.16)
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Both, manure and CHP bonus can only be rewarded for electric-
ty for which also the base rate is awarded:∑
yu,yy
xosYyYuyu,yy −
∑
yu,yy
xsYyYuyu,yy ≤ 0
xsYuh −
∑
yu,yy
xsYyYuyu,yy ≤ 0
(A.17)
The EEG2012 replaces the old system of base price and boni
y introducing two remuneration classes for biogas feedstock.
he remuneration is granted according to the share of the feed-
tock classes in the total methane produced. As the remuneration
emains tiered (Yu), this introduces a quadratic relationship into
he constraints, which has to be resolved using discretization in
ur mixed integer linear model. We  deﬁned remuneration activ-
ties (Yz) with ﬁxed relationships between the two  remuneration
lasses ranging from 100% remuneration class I to 100% remunera-
ion class II in steps of 10%. Except for the extremes, we introduced
wo activities at each step, one (xslYyYuYz) serving as the lower bound
f a 10% interval and the other as the upper bound (xsuYyYuYz).
We  further deﬁned mutually exclusive binary activities
zynoYyYz), which make sure the boundary activities of only one
nterval within a tier can be used. In this way, we  make sure that the
elationship between the remuneration classes is (at least approxi-
ately) equal in all tiers. Otherwise the optimization might lead to
he remuneration of electricity of one class in the lower tier and of
he other one in a higher tier. (The relationship between rewards
ranted for each remuneration class is not the same between the
iers.)
xslYyYuYzyu,yy,yz+1 +x
suYyYuYz
yu,yy,yz −aYuz
ynoYyYz
yy,yz ≤ 0 ∀yz, yu, yy∑
yz
(zynoYyYzyy,yz ) ≤ 1 ∀yy
(A.18)
The EEG 2012 further restricts the share of maize in the total
eedstock mass to 60%,
∑
yu,yy,yz
(xslYyYuYzyu,yy,yz+1 + x
suYyYuYz
yu,yy,yz ) −Mzy12m ≤ 0
zy12m +zn12m ≤ 1
(A.19)
nd requires the combined use of at least 60% of the heat for plants,
hose feedstock consists of less than 60% manure. A special uniﬁed
remium (xsYx) is granted for small plants up to 75 kW that use
anure for more than 80% of the electricity production. Together
ith the manure bonus of EEG 2009, these are combined into a
utually exclusive set of reward options in the model using binary
ctivities,
yYx + zy60o + zyuo + znuo ≤ 1 (A.20)
hich are used to apply different manure share requirements,
∑
g
xuGg −xtYx −xtu60o −xtuGo −Mznuo ≤ 0
∑−
g∈Go
(xuGg ) +0.8xtYx +0.6xtu60o +0.3xtuGo ≤ 0
(A.21)licy 46 (2015) 50–64 61
with
xtu60o −Mzy60o ≤ 0
xtuGo −Mzyuo ≤ 0 (A.22)
and then allow the use of the respective schemes:
xsYx − MzyYx ≤ 0 (A.23)
arCHP
∑
yu,yy,yz
(xslYyYuYzyu,yy,yz+1 + x
suYyYuYz
yu,yy,yz ) − Mzy60o ≤ 0 (A.24)
In our simulations, we  only consider the two extreme scenar-
ios that either all or no agents can use all of the available heat. The
requirement to use the heat is therefore not explicitly implemented
in the model. Under the assumption that all agents have the poten-
tial of external heat use, the coefﬁcient arCHP is set to zero as the
condition will be fulﬁlled per se. In the other case, the coefﬁcient
arCHP is set to one and no biogas plant with less than 60% of manure
can be rewarded according to EEG 2012.
Of course, the total biogas electricity sold cannot surpass the
quantity produced:
xsYx + xsGe +
∑
yu,yy,yz
(xslYyYuYzyu,yy,yz+1 + x
suYyYuYz
yu,yy,yz )
−
∑
g∈Gb
(auGg x
uG
g ) ≤ 0
As before, remuneration under EEG 2012 is subject to the estab-
lishment of an EEG contract.
xsYx +
∑
yu,yy,yz
(xslYyYuYz
yu,yy,yz+1 + x
suYyYuYz
yu,yy,yz ) −x
iYy
yy ≤ b
Yy
yy ∀yy
xiYyyy −xiˇUe ≤ 0 for yy = 2012
(A.25)
A.3. MEKA III
For each of the four MEKA measures (ym ∈ Ym) a certain num-
ber of points (aYmym ) is awarded for each unit (x
Ym
ym , e.g. ha, animal,
farm) registered for participation. For each point received (xsYm),
the agent is rewarded with csYm = 10 Euro under MEKA III regula-
tions.
xsYm −
∑
ym
(aYmym x
Ym
ym ) ≤ 0 (A.26)
A minimum amount to be rewarded of 250 Euro is required for
participation and a maximum of 40,000 Euro can be awarded per
agent.
csYmxsYm ≤ 40,  000
xsYm −MzylYm ≤ 0
−csYmxsYm +250zylYm ≤ 0
(A.27)
The implementation of measure A2 (Diversiﬁcation of crop rota-
tion) requires the inclusion of several binary integer variables: two
variables to represent the decision whether to participate (zyYm3A2 ) or
not (znYm3A2 ), which are of course mutually exclusive.zyYm3A2 + znYm3A2 ≤ 1 (A.28)
Then for each crop group (Jym) potentially included in the agent
crop rotation and counted for diversiﬁcation, two  binary integer
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(Campolongo et al., 2007) with 1200 simulation runs to iden-
tify the parameters with the highest inﬂuence on installed biogas
capacity, maize areas, land use and MEKA participation, we retained
14 parameters for the experimental design used in the main part of
Table 7
Parameter settings tested during the calibration and validation experiments.
Parameter group Parameter Range Fixed at
Initial agent
population
population Three asset distributions
birth factor past [1; 1.05]
potsuc prob male [0.5; 1]
Yields maize yc [0.8; 0.9]
wheat normal [1; 1.1]
wps Yes/no Yes
wps  coef [1;1.3] 1.15
Crop rotation maize on maize 0, 1/2, 1 1/2
maizerotlimit [0.4;0.6]
Field working days clregion 4, 5
Contracted ﬁeld
work
workforhirecoef [0; 1] 0.5
proptohire [0.5; 2]
Cattle feeding freshgrasslabor [1; 3]
freshgrassloss [0; 0.2] 0.1
Markets biertreber Yes/no2 C. Troost et al. / Land 
ariables indicate whether it has been included (zyJym
jym
) or not (znJym
jym
).
he condition of requiring at least four crops with a minimum share
f 15% is enforced in the model by the following system of equations
note: xSrs is a crop rotation variable that sums up all arable land):
4zyYm3A2 −
∑
jym
zyJym
jym
zyJym
jym
+znJym
jym ∑
s
xSrs −xt1Ym3A2 −xt2Ym3A2
−MznJym
jym
+0.15xt1Ym3A2 +0.15xt2Ym3A2
Fallow can be counted as a crop to fulﬁll diversiﬁcation require-
ents, but no points are awarded for fallow areas. Two more
ariables are needed in the model to distinguish between fallow
rea (xt1Ym3A2 ) and non-fallow area (x
t2Ym
3A2 ). According to MEKA regu-
ations, only the later can be counted to achieve the points:
xsYm −1xt2Ym3A2 ≤ 0
−MzyYm3A2 +xt1Ym3A2 +xt2Ym3A2 ≤ 0
xt1Ym3A2 −
∑
l∈Loil
xLl ≤ 0
xt2Ym3A2 −
∑
l/∈Loil,Lgg
xLl ≤ 0
(A.30)
Further, the restriction on maize cultivation is implemented as
ollows:∑
∈Lmai
xLl − 0.4xt1Ym3A2 − 0.4xt2Ym3A2 − MznYm3A2 ≤ 0 (A.31)
As in reality, agent participation in the extensive grassland meas-
res B1(zyYm3B1 ) and B2 (z
yYm
3B2 ) is mutually exclusive.
yYm
3B1 + z
yYm
3B2 + znYm3B ≤ 1 (A.32)
The restriction on the animal-to-land ratio (< 2 LSU/ha agricul-
ural area for B1 and < 1.4 LSUA/ha AA and 0.3–1.4 gLSU/ha fodder
rea for B2) is implemented in the model using different calculation
ctivities (xclu, xcrlu).
For the LSU/AA ratio:∑
a
(aAlua x
A
a ) −2.0xclu3B1 −1.4zclu3B2 −MznYm3B ≤ 0
xclu3B1 +xclu3B2 −
∑
l
xL
l
≤ 0
xclu3B1 −Mz
yYm
3B1 ≤ 0
(A.33)
For the gLSU/MF ratio:∑
a
(aAlua x
A
a ) −1.4xcrlu3B2 −Mxcrlun3B2 ≤ 0
−
∑
a
(aAlua x
A
a ) +0.3xcrlu3B2 ≤ 0
xcrlu3B2 +xcrlun3B2 −
∑
l∈Lmf
xL
l
= 0
xcrlu −MzyYm −MznYm ≤ 0
(A.34)n3B2 3B1 3B
Receiving points requires fulﬁllment of the conditions and is
estricted by the available grassland area, and in the case of B1 bylicy 46 (2015) 50–64
≤ 0
≤ 1 ∀jym
≤ 0
(1LJym
l,jym
xLl ) ≤ 0 ∀jym
(A.29)
the additional condition of cutting 5% of the area the ﬁrst time after
the ﬁfteenth of July.
xYm3B1 +xYm3B2 −
∑
l∈Lgg
xLl ≤ 0
0.05xYm3B1 −
∑
l∈Lb4
xLl ≤ 0
xYm3B1 −Mx
yYm
3B1 ≤ 0
xYm3B2 −Mx
yYm
3B2 ≤ 0
−xYm3B1 +x
yYm
3B1 ≤ 0
−xYm3B2 +x
yYm
3B2 ≤ 0
(A.35)
As mentioned above we  assume in the model that grassland
activities with late cuts (Lb4) fulﬁll the required species mix  for
measure B4.
xYm3B4 −
∑
l∈Lb4
(xLl ) ≤ 0 (A.36)
Appendix B. Model uncertainty
Table 7 lists the 19 parameters of the MPMAS  Central Swabian
Jura model that were identiﬁed as uncertain after calibration by
Troost and Berger (2014). After an elementary effects screeningkwkyno Yes/no
Manure high manure maize Yes/no
manure [1; 1.5]
Farm household ihorizon type 4 different versions
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he analysis. These are printed in boldface in the table. The ﬁve
arameters that showed little inﬂuence were ﬁxed at the value
hown in the third column of the table.
The ﬁrst three parameters control the characteristics of the
nput agent population. The ﬁrst one determines which of the three
ampled agent populations were used. birth factor past scales the
ertility assumed when determining the initial agent household
ompositions (considering that birth rates in the past and in rural
reas were probably higher than the German average of the last
ecade). potsuc prob male is the probability that a male descendant
s interested to pursue a career in farming and thus is considered a
otential successor of the current farm manager.
Parameters related to crop yields include a scaling factor for
heat (wheat normal), a scaling factor for silage maize yields
maize yc)  to reﬂect the uncertainty of maize production in the
tudy region, and two  factors which include or exclude the pro-
uction of whole-plant silage (wps) and scale whole-plant silage
ields (wps coef) as we  consider this an innovation and we have no
ata on the diffusion of this technology and little information on
rop yields.
Two parameters affect the potential maize area of an agent:
aize on maize controls the number of years that maize can be
rown after itself, and maizerotlimit constitutes the upper limit for
he total share of maize in the crop rotation.
Parameters related to ﬁeld work include the KTBL climate region
or estimating the available days for ﬁeld work (clregion). Fur-
her, the workforhirecoef scales the price for contracted ﬁeld work
etween the maximum and the minimum of the range given in
TBL (2010), while the proptohire coefﬁcient scales the availability
f hired ﬁeld work per hour with suitable weather (see Troost and
erger, 2014).
The freshgrasslabor coefﬁcient scales the amount of labor neces-
ary for feeding freshly cut grass and the freshgrassloss coefﬁcient
ndicates the share of corresponding harvest losses. The biertre-
er parameter controls whether brewery by-products are generally
vailable as fodder. The kwkyno parameter controls whether excess
rocess heat can be sold on local markets.
Two parameters are related to the maximum amount of manure
hat can be applied to a crop. The production activities that consider
anure use, assume a standard amount of manure use, which effec-
ively creates an upper limit of manure application to each crop.
he manure parameter scales this upper limit on manure use of all
roduction activities in order to test whether the assumed standard
mounts may  be too low. The high manure maize is speciﬁc to silage
aize production. It controls the inclusion of speciﬁc silage maize
roduction activities, which assume a manure amount of 30 m3
nstead of the standard 20 m3 (with the complementing mineral
ertilization reduced).
Last, the ihorizon type represents four different implementa-
ions of the inﬂuence of farm household composition on the
roduction decisions of the farm: In the simplest version, the
nvestment horizon () is independent of the farm manager’s age
nd the farm manager derives no utility from employing potential
uccessors. In the second version, the investment horizon remains
ndependent of the farm manager’s age, but the farm manager
erives utility from employing potential successors (see Troost
nd Berger, 2014). In the third version, the investment horizon
epends only on the age of the current household head, while in
he fourth version it depends on the age of a potential successor if
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